Operation Desert Fox Against 

Iraq Has Left More Debris in 
Current U.S.-Arab Relations 

 

U.S. insistence on maintaining sanctions undermines the mere survival and sense of dignity of the Iraqi people

By DR. CLOVIS MAKSOUD 

     Now that Operation Desert Fox is over, what political and diplomatic damage will come in the wake of this unrelenting display of sheer military power? While the campaign was staged with an unprecedented intensity,

 an equally intense popular response took place throughout the Arab World. However, this should not be mistaken, as it often is, for support of Saddam’s regime or its practices. In this respect, U.S. policy is flawed, for it treats any 

opposition to the punishing acts against Iraq as if it were sympathetic to the Iraqi regime.

   

        In the same way Saddam misreads the global and regional balances and interprets events to reinforce his regime’s policies and its propensity for dangerous brinkmanship, so does the U.S. policy establishment misread 

the impact of their actions on the Arab and Muslim peoples. In this respect, the recent statement that the military actions taken just before the holy month of Ramadhan was intended to show sensitivity to Muslims was

 instead perceived by Muslims as a fraudulent delicacy and a resentful patronization. It implied that Muslims can be victimized anytime except during Ramadhan. Whoever advised President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair was contributing, perhaps mistakenly, to the blundering haughtiness which characterizes this flawed discourse. The peace process, which President Clinton worked assiduously to salvage, has been further damaged and the goodwill President Clinton’s visit to Gaza generated has been squandered.  The United States’ incapacity to discern the consequences of its military 

attack claiming to protect and safeguard Iraq’s neighbors shows an incapacity to anticipate the consequences on the peoples throughout the Arab World. Even at the peak of inter-Arab conflicts, there is always a nagging sense of embarrassment that one of the parties seems to require the shielding of a superpower despite the implications of continued dependency.

     U.S. officials who repeat that Arab leaders relay to them in private approval for its action demonstrate clearly that they do not represent their public. This notion of being told in private what cannot be articulated in public has been the hallmark of much U.S. communication with the Arab World, especially when the Arab street is emboldened in its opposition to U.S. policies and responds with a dismissive statement of being “the only game in town.

     The aftermath of Operation Desert Fox has left other debris in current U.S.-Arab relations. To begin with, the U.S. military action on Iraq was in glaring contra-distinction with the U.S. protectiveness when Israel violates U.N. Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, when a resolution is objectionable to Israel, the United States renders itself readily available for veto. This is what the Arabs consider blatant double standard. 

     So, while Saddam’s regime might be very unpopular and opposed, among many sectors of the Arab population, more unpopular is the U.S. insistence on maintaining sanctions which further undermine the mere survival and sense of dignity of the Iraqi people. Additionally, when UNSCOM has proven to have had an admitted Israeli spy and a sustained relationship with Israeli intelligence as reported by Mr. Ritter, even legal intervention by UNSCOM becomes perceived as unduly intrusive and adversarial. Then comes Chairman Butler of UNSCOM talking at, instead of to the facilitators, or those in charge of facilitating access to the targets of inspection. Butler’s conception of his mandate is clearly untenable as it provokes deep resentment among the Arabs from all walks of life. Butler’s articulation, if not answered, tends to humiliate. If UNSCOM is to restore its credibility and effectiveness, a reconfiguration of its composition and leadership has to be undertaken as asked for by a growing number of United Nations members. Furthermore, the Arabs feels very strongly that disunity among their governments has rendered their overall Arab patrimony vulnerable and fragile. This has enabled the U.S. and Israel to consider the divided Arabs an easy prey for both to project their power with impunity which, at times, drives people to uncontrolled, albeit, understandable anger. 

     The studied contempt with which the Arab street is dismissed by most U.S. officials and media establishments creates a serious impediment to a U.S.-Arab dialogue of consequence. Confining the thrust of U.S. relations with the Arab world to leaders ready to comply with U.S. policies without question of reservation fritters away the chances of healthy interaction. The propensity of the government of the United States to hear from Arabs what it likes to hear instead of what it ought to hear has seriously undermined the development of sustainable and rational policy and relations.

     Four nights of intensive bombing of Baghdad and Basra and other cities was a clear demonstration of the crudeness and ruthlessness of sheer destructive power. It is for the Arabs both impressive and repressive. The highly sophisticated arsenal of U.S. weaponry and the will to use its components on an Arab country has derailed much of the attention needed to bring the Iraqi regime into compliance. Add to this the marginality of the U.N.’s presence in Iraq as fashioned in February 1999,  and you have a prescription for a repeat explosive situation.

Dr. Clovis Maksoud is former ambassador of  the League of Arab States

 to the United Nations. and the United States. He is director of the Center

 for the Global South and a professor of international relations at 

American University, in Washington , D.C.